Day 13 of reading and sharing my notes on Project 2025 (the long title is Mandate for Leadership 2024: The Conservative Promise, in case you're searching for it).

Here's my approach and why I’m doing this.

SUMMARY

We're still in Section 2: The Common Defense, Chapter 4: Department of Defense by Christopher Miller. I covered his bio earlier.

This section is titled "DOD Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)."

The under secretary for the above was established by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and "led to the single largest DOD structural chance since ... 1986 ..."

Miller suggests three "needed reforms," with several specific points under each. I won't go through them all, but I'll highlight anything that seems outside of normal procedure.

Here are his three main points: 1) "Champion , engage, and focus the American innovation ecosystem"; 2) "Improve the rapid deployment of technology to the battlefield"; 3) "Develop a framework to protect the RDT&E enterprise from foreign exploitation."

**-The first point under innovation is to "engage leverage all America's scientific, engineering, and high-tech production communities to" work on technology "on a continuing basis to preserve our warfighting advantage."

MY OPINION

All? Really? I don't want the entire science, engineering, and tech community to be working on stuff for war. What about preventing disease? Climate change? And just generally making our lives better?

SUMMARY

He talks about reducing the number "of critical technology areas ... to concentrate effort and resources on those that bear directly on great-power competition."

MY OPINION

Consolidation is generally good. But which does he want to get rid of? And what is "great-power competition"?

Also, some of this chapter is written so badly that I get the feeling the author doesn't want people to know what he's talking about. It's a stark change in style from the earlier chapters, which are pretty comprehensible. Take this, for example: "Move toward a much more comprehensive independent risk-reduction approach to increase understanding of the technical risks by drawing on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition programs succeed."

I know what all of these words mean. But put together? How can you be more collaborative -- laboratories and agencies -- and also independent? And "succeed" is such a general word that it could mean anything, depending on who is saying it. I mean, an acquisition program succeeds if the stuff is acquired, right? Or is there more to it than that? (Probably, but it's not here.)

SUMMARY

The next bit is just about making developing technology more efficiently he does define "great-power competition" as China. There's more talk of preparing for the battlefield. And more about keeping China from stealing U.S. technology, "underpinned with a full range of consequences for attempted or actual theft."

MY OPINION

No mention of Russia in a section on foreign exploitation is interesting.

SUMMARY

The next section is: "DOD Foreign Military Sales."

**-Miller is critical of a drop in U.S. foreign military sales, from $55.7 billion in 2018 to $34.8 billion in 2021. He argues for "expanding our 'defense ecosystem.'"

The reforms he suggests appear to be dropping the prices and then raising them later. Here's his actual wording: "Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions."

**- Under needed reforms, he lists "End informal congressional notification." This is a practice the Department of State has done, letting Congress know that we're selling arms to foreign governments, but it's not technically required.

**- Instead, he says the DOD should "Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the 'weaponization' by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification."

MY OPINION

I want Congress to know when we're selling arms to foreign governments. And I don't want DOD sidestepping the process.

This is an example of hypocrisy in the document, where it complains about bureaucrats circumventing presidential power but then advocates circumventing congressional oversight.

SUMMARY

He says the U.S. needs to collaborate with allies and let them "focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States."

He also wants to "decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia."

He also wants to better fund "contracting capacity" to speed of defense production, and well as to "rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making ..."

That's all for now. The next section of this chapter is DOD Personnel.

In case, you're wondering, we're 135 pages into the 922 in my copy. I think this is a particularly long chapter, but we'll see how the others are going forward.